“Australia is a long way from anywhere” – Adjunct Professor Warwick Powell at AUKUS Inquiry on 25 August 2026.
Government claims that AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States was thrown into question at a public hearing in Brisbane yesterday.
In the scheme of things, AUKUS is not much of a defence pact. It may be considered as an extension of the old ANZUS treaty. The touted strategic aim is to assist the US to pivot to Asia and to contain China by buying attack class nuclear submarines. Far more telling are the current arrangements between the US, Israel and the Ukraine in the US wars of choice against Iran and Russia. West Asia and Europe is currently where the war is. In comparison, Australia’s Indo-Pacific region is asleep.
AUKUS was announced on 15 September 2021 by Scott Morrison, Boris Johnson and Joe Biden as a trilateral security partnership. – Wikipedia.
The Morrison Coalition government then lost the May 2022 election, with Labor winning government in a landslide. And the Labor government followed suit by backing AUKUS causing much concern for the ‘Whitlam’ Labor elite including Keating, Bob Carr, Gareth Evans, Carmen Lawrence, Peter Garrett and others.
From minister to strategic weapons dealer
Meanwhile Christopher Pyne, a former Defence Minister from August 2018 until May 2019, moved into the arms/lobbying sector. This was just prior to the announcement of AUKUS. Such a move is part of a well established ‘revolving door’ in western democracies by former ministers into the war machine. For example, former Australian prime minister Scott Morrison is now Vice Chairman of American Global Strategies (AGS). AGS, on appointing Morrison, described him as one of the architects of AUKUS. Pyne and Morrison join a conga line of former ministers and senior government figures who, after leaving public office, have gone on to take up highly paid positions in the defence industry and strategic arms sector. Among them are former Defence Ministers Brendan Nelson and Joel Fitzgibbon, former Defence Minister and ambassador Kim Beazley, and former intelligence chief Nick Warner, along with many others.
AUKUS precedent: a non-nuclear-weapons state (Australia) given access to naval nuclear-propulsion technology and nuclear material by the United States and United Kingdom. When AUKUS was announced on 15 September 2021, the Australian Government said the partnership would enable the Royal Australian Navy to acquire and operate a fleet of at least eight nuclear-powered submarines. The first major initiative under AUKUS was Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, which the Morrison Government described as a transformation of Australia’s naval capability.
Under the subsequent AUKUS submarine pathway announced in March 2023, the United States and United Kingdom would establish a rotational presence of nuclear-powered submarines at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia from as early as 2027. This would ultimately comprise one UK Astute-class submarine and up to four US Virginia-class submarines.
AUKUS Pillar II involved cooperation between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to develop military technologies with a particular focus on near-term wars. This included drones, both airborne and under sea, artificial intelligence, cyber hacking, quantum technologies, unmanned undersea vehicles, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare. The Australian governments major contribution in this area is through the US spy base at Pine Gap and the use of the wedge tail program to monitor missile launches in the US war of choice against Iran.
Intelligence is shared with the US and Israel.
Mike Henry of Just Peace pointed out that the three AUKUS partners have agreed to ensure interoperability between their forces, including common control systems and the sharing of research and technological outcomes.
This concern was underlined by Admiral Chris Barrie, former Chief of the Australian Defence Force, who argued that the agreement provides indemnity for US and UK partners should Australian inventions result in harm to their forces. The former Admiral posed the national question: should Australia keep its own (military) technologies secret, or should it share them with its AUKUS partners? The question goes to the heart of national sovereignty and intellectual-property rights raised by Pillar II of AUKUS.
The Workers Bush Telegraph position would be to close the weapons factories, particularly those companies and facilities that have been associated with the supply chains supporting Israel’s military operations in Palestine.
This includes a wide range of companies operating in Australia or connected to Australian defence production, including NIOA, Elbit Systems, Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing, Rheinmetall and others.
For us, this is not simply a question of individual contracts or particular weapons systems. It is a question of the role of the Australian defence industry in a global arms system that generates enormous corporate profits while weapons are being used in wars in which civilians are being killed and displaced.
The position is therefore not simply that Australia should change its procurement policies. It is that the expansion of the weapons industry itself needs to be challenged, particularly where Australian public money, research and manufacturing capacity are tied into international weapons corporations whose products or components enter military supply chains connected to Israel.
Ian Curr
26 August 2026
AUKUS Notes*
The AUKUS inquiry, which was organised by the Australian Peace and Security Forum and is funded by individual donations, poses the question: What are Australians being asked to sign up to?
The Brisbane hearing of the AUKUS Public Inquiry on Tuesday, 25 August 2026, chaired by Peter Garrett, with commissioners Carmen Lawrence, Admiral Chris Barrie and indigenous representative Karina Lester, produced a wide-ranging examination of Australia’s involvement in AUKUS.
The hearing began at about 10am at the Queensland Council of Unions in South Brisbane. Around 40 people attended in person, while the proceedings were livestreamed on YouTube, attracting as many as 750 people online. The online audience was active, contributing comments and conducting online debate throughout the day.
What emerged from the hearing was that AUKUS is about far more than the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Witnesses raised fundamental questions about Australian sovereignty, the possibility of war with China, the constitutional power to commit Australia to war, nuclear waste, the sharing of advanced technology, the role of the United States, the cost of the program, parliamentary accountability and the absence of meaningful public consultation.
1. Marianne Hanson: AUKUS and Australia’s strategic vulnerability
Senator Dr Marianne Hanson, a Queensland Labor senator and member of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN).
Hanson argued that AUKUS represents an important precedent because Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon state, has entered an arrangement involving highly sensitive nuclear-powered submarine technology developed by the United States and United Kingdom.
She argued that AUKUS places Australia under increasing US strategic demands and could make Australia a target, particularly because of Australia’s integration into US strategic systems and the role of the Pine Gap facility in the US-Australian intelligence relationship.
Hanson argued that smaller, conventionally powered submarines could provide a more appropriate form of defence for Australia’s surrounding waters.
She acknowledged that nuclear propulsion provides advantages in speed and endurance and eliminates the need for conventional refuelling. However, she argued that these characteristics also make the submarines part of a strategic weapons system capable of operating over long distances and pursuing other submarines.
A question was raised about the rotation of submarines based at HMAS Stirling. Hanson emphasised that these are not simply defensive vessels but attack submarines.
The question of nuclear waste was also raised.
2. Professor Graham Holton: diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation
Professor Graham Holton followed with evidence that placed AUKUS within the broader question of war and peace.
He referred to the current wars involving the United States, Israel and Iran and argued that these conflicts demonstrated a failure of diplomacy.
Holton discussed China, regional tensions and the importance of international institutions. He referred to the Treaty of Rarotonga, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty signed by Australia under Prime Minister Bob Hawke.
He also discussed innocent passage of ships through international waters, freedom of navigation, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
His argument was that nuclear-powered submarines represent a belligerent strategic approach rather than simply a defensive one.
3. Andrew Irvine: the Electrical Trades Union
Andrew Irvine, publicity officer for the Queensland Electrical Trades Union, argued that there had been a profound lack of consultation over AUKUS.
Speaking as a lifelong unionist, Irvine recalled the example of former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange and New Zealand’s opposition to nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels.
He said that, personally, he opposed AUKUS because he did not want his children and grandchildren saddled with what he regarded as a dangerous development.
Comment: The Queensland/NT ETU has a longstanding position opposing both nuclear power and nuclear weapons.
When Rear Admiral Chris Barry asked how the inquiry should undertake community engagement, Irvine suggested using the existing community and peace organisations already campaigning against nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines. Irvine made no mention of union action to stop AUKUS.
4. Professor C. Samford: who decides whether Australia goes to war?
Professor C. Samford of Griffith University argued that the inquiry needed to go back to the fundamental question of war and peace.
He discussed the United Nations, the possibility of another world war and the need for independent legal and expert advice before Australia embarks upon military action.
He referred to the Iraq War and the flawed decisions taken by John Howard (Australia)and Tony Blair (UK). He questioned the concentration of executive power and the role of the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Governor-General and Defence Act in decisions to commit Australia to war.
Samford argued that Australia should not repeat the experience of Iraq and questioned whether existing arrangements provide adequate legal safeguards.
He also suggested that parliamentary approval alone might not be sufficient and that independent legal oversight is necessary.
The possibility of a High Court challenge
Rear Admiral Chris Barrie asked Samford about the possibility of challenging aspects of AUKUS in the High Court.
Such a challenge would raise difficult constitutional and practical questions. It would require strong legal grounds, expert constitutional counsel and substantial preparation. A losing party could face significant costs.
The secrecy surrounding AUKUS would also make establishing the factual basis for any legal challenge particularly difficult.
The discussion nevertheless highlighted the larger question of whether there is an adequate legal mechanism for challenging fundamental executive decisions concerning Australia’s defence and foreign policy.
Rear Admiral Chris Barrie: sovereignty and war powers
Rear Admiral Chris Barrie compared the Australian and American constitutional traditions.
He argued that the two countries developed very different approaches to executive power and war-making.
He warned against assuming that Australia’s alliance with the United States means Australia must simply accept American strategic priorities.
Barrie referred to Rupert Murdoch’s influence during the Iraq War and criticised the role of powerful media interests in encouraging governments towards war. He described such influences as “cheerleaders of folly.”
He also questioned whether Australia needs stronger constitutional safeguards concerning the power to commit the country to war.
Karina Lester raised the question of whether First Nations people had been adequately informed and consulted about AUKUS.
5. Mike Henry: AUKUS is bigger than submarines
Mike Henry of Just Peace Queensland focused on AUKUS fact sheets, particularly those dealing with uncrewed undersea vehicles.
He argued that Australians should understand AUKUS as a much broader weapons, surveillance and undersea technology system rather than simply a submarine acquisition program.
The crewed submarines and surface vessels form part of a wider system involving uncrewed underwater technologies. Because Australia, Britain and the United States are developing interoperable systems, there are questions about common control systems, technology sharing and Australian sovereignty over technologies developed here.
Henry criticised some official AUKUS fact sheets as having a marketing or promotional character.
Peter Garrett noted that many Australians speak English as a second or third language and may struggle to understand highly technical AUKUS material.
Barrie also raised the issue of Australia’s obligations to indemnify its partners in relation to technologies developed under the program and questioned whether Australia should retain greater control over technologies it develops itself.
6. Adrian Pisarzki: the opportunity cost
Adrian Pisarzki, who said he had been a member of the Labor Party since 1981, challenged the economic case for AUKUS.
He referred to the estimated $368 billion cost and suggested the final figure could reach $500 billion.
Pisarzki argued that conventionally powered Japanese submarines could provide an alternative at a much lower cost.
His central argument was about opportunity cost.
He pointed to Australia’s housing crisis, homelessness, free or cheaper university education, dental care and medical care.
He argued that the enormous sums committed to AUKUS could instead be used to address Australia’s social problems and restore elements of the social-democratic system that existed when university education was free.
He also questioned whether Australia would ever receive the full submarine capability promised under AUKUS.
7. Warwick Powell: China, superannuation and Australian sovereignty
Adjunct Professor Warwick Powell questioned Australia’s strategic dependence upon the United States.
He described Australia as a large continent a long way from the world’s major centres of conflict and questioned what he described as Australia’s “supine fear” concerning China.
Powell argued that Australia’s security architecture should not effectively be provided by another country.
He also questioned why Australian superannuation funds invest in American markets and defence industries and called for greater transparency and auditing of those investments.
He argued that China is too economically and strategically important to Asia to be excluded from discussions about the region’s future security architecture.
His central argument was that China must be part of the conversation about Asian security.
8. Claire Moore — parliamentary scrutiny and social licence
Former Queensland Senator Claire Moore made an important submission concerning parliamentary accountability and the need for a social licence for AUKUS.
Moore questioned the separation of defence policy from foreign affairs and trade and argued that decisions of such magnitude require much greater parliamentary scrutiny.
She said she could not find a clear public record explaining where and how the original Morrison Government decision to enter AUKUS had been made.
She argued that the decision should have been subjected to parliamentary scrutiny, including through Senate Estimates and the committee system.
Moore was particularly concerned about the proposed eastern-seaboard submarine facility at Port Kembla, where she said the local community feels targeted but has not been given a meaningful role in determining what happens.
She emphasised the importance of social licence, particularly where communities are being asked to accept nuclear infrastructure and the long-term storage and disposal of radioactive waste.
Rear Admiral Chris Barry agreed that nuclear waste is a paramount issue.
Moore’s evidence therefore connected several of the central themes of the inquiry: parliamentary accountability, community consultation, nuclear waste and the democratic legitimacy of AUKUS.
8. Margaret Pestorius: AUKUS and the military-industrial system.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTy6zP-vVnQ
What emerged from the hearing was that AUKUS is about far more than the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Witnesses raised fundamental questions about Australian sovereignty, the possibility of war with China, the constitutional power to commit Australia to war, nuclear waste, the sharing of advanced technology, the role of the United States, the cost of the program, parliamentary accountability and the absence of meaningful public consultation.
1. Marianne Hanson: AUKUS and Australia’s strategic vulnerability
Senator Dr Marianne Hanson, a Queensland Labor senator and member of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN).
Hanson argued that AUKUS represents an important precedent because Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon state, has entered an arrangement involving highly sensitive nuclear-powered submarine technology developed by the United States and United Kingdom.
She argued that AUKUS places Australia under increasing US strategic demands and could make Australia a target, particularly because of Australia’s integration into US strategic systems and the role of the Pine Gap facility in the US-Australian intelligence relationship.
Hanson argued that smaller, conventionally powered submarines could provide a more appropriate form of defence for Australia’s surrounding waters.
She acknowledged that nuclear propulsion provides advantages in speed and endurance and eliminates the need for conventional refuelling. However, she argued that these characteristics also make the submarines part of a strategic weapons system capable of operating over long distances and pursuing other submarines.
A question was raised about the rotation of submarines based at HMAS Stirling. Hanson emphasised that these are not simply defensive vessels but attack submarines.
The question of nuclear waste was also raised.
2. Professor Graham Holton: diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation
Professor Graham Holton followed with evidence that placed AUKUS within the broader question of war and peace.
He referred to the current wars involving the United States, Israel and Iran and argued that these conflicts demonstrated a failure of diplomacy.
Holton discussed China, regional tensions and the importance of international institutions. He referred to the Treaty of Rarotonga, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty signed by Australia under Prime Minister Bob Hawke.
He also discussed innocent passage of ships through international waters, freedom of navigation, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
His argument was that nuclear-powered submarines represent a belligerent strategic approach rather than simply a defensive one.
3. Andrew Irvine: the Electrical Trades Union
Andrew Irvine, publicity officer for the Queensland Electrical Trades Union, argued that there had been a profound lack of consultation over AUKUS.
Speaking as a lifelong unionist, Irvine recalled the example of former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange and New Zealand’s opposition to nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels.
He said that, personally, he opposed AUKUS because he did not want his children and grandchildren saddled with what he regarded as a dangerous development.
Comment: The Queensland/NT ETU has a longstanding position opposing both nuclear power and nuclear weapons.
When Rear Admiral Chris Barry asked how the inquiry should undertake community engagement, Irvine suggested using the existing community and peace organisations already campaigning against nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines. Irvine made no mention of union action to stop AUKUS.
4. Professor C. Samford: who decides whether Australia goes to war?
Professor C. Samford of Griffith University argued that the inquiry needed to go back to the fundamental question of war and peace.
He discussed the United Nations, the possibility of another world war and the need for independent legal and expert advice before Australia embarks upon military action.
He referred to the Iraq War and the flawed decisions taken by John Howard (Australia)and Tony Blair (UK). He questioned the concentration of executive power and the role of the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Governor-General and Defence Act in decisions to commit Australia to war.
Samford argued that Australia should not repeat the experience of Iraq and questioned whether existing arrangements provide adequate legal safeguards.
He also suggested that parliamentary approval alone might not be sufficient and that independent legal oversight is necessary.
The possibility of a High Court challenge
Rear Admiral Chris Barrie asked Samford about the possibility of challenging aspects of AUKUS in the High Court.
Such a challenge would raise difficult constitutional and practical questions. It would require strong legal grounds, expert constitutional counsel and substantial preparation. A losing party could face significant costs.
The secrecy surrounding AUKUS would also make establishing the factual basis for any legal challenge particularly difficult.
The discussion nevertheless highlighted the larger question of whether there is an adequate legal mechanism for challenging fundamental executive decisions concerning Australia’s defence and foreign policy.
Rear Admiral Chris Barrie: sovereignty and war powers
Rear Admiral Chris Barrie compared the Australian and American constitutional traditions.
He argued that the two countries developed very different approaches to executive power and war-making.
He warned against assuming that Australia’s alliance with the United States means Australia must simply accept American strategic priorities.
Barrie referred to Rupert Murdoch’s influence during the Iraq War and criticised the role of powerful media interests in encouraging governments towards war. He described such influences as “cheerleaders of folly.”
He also questioned whether Australia needs stronger constitutional safeguards concerning the power to commit the country to war.
Karina Lester raised the question of whether First Nations people had been adequately informed and consulted about AUKUS.
5. Mike Henry: AUKUS is bigger than submarines
Mike Henry of Just Peace Queensland focused on AUKUS fact sheets, particularly those dealing with uncrewed undersea vehicles.
He argued that Australians should understand AUKUS as a much broader weapons, surveillance and undersea technology system rather than simply a submarine acquisition program.
The crewed submarines and surface vessels form part of a wider system involving uncrewed underwater technologies. Because Australia, Britain and the United States are developing interoperable systems, there are questions about common control systems, technology sharing and Australian sovereignty over technologies developed here.
Henry criticised some official AUKUS fact sheets as having a marketing or promotional character.
Peter Garrett noted that many Australians speak English as a second or third language and may struggle to understand highly technical AUKUS material.
Barrie also raised the issue of Australia’s obligations to indemnify its partners in relation to technologies developed under the program and questioned whether Australia should retain greater control over technologies it develops itself.
6. Adrian Pisarzki: the opportunity cost
Adrian Pisarzki, who said he had been a member of the Labor Party since 1981, challenged the economic case for AUKUS.
He referred to the estimated $368 billion cost and suggested the final figure could reach $500 billion.
Pisarzki argued that conventionally powered Japanese submarines could provide an alternative at a much lower cost.
His central argument was about opportunity cost.
He pointed to Australia’s housing crisis, homelessness, free or cheaper university education, dental care and medical care.
He argued that the enormous sums committed to AUKUS could instead be used to address Australia’s social problems and restore elements of the social-democratic system that existed when university education was free.
He also questioned whether Australia would ever receive the full submarine capability promised under AUKUS.
7. Warwick Powell: China, superannuation and Australian sovereignty
Adjunct Professor Warwick Powell questioned Australia’s strategic dependence upon the United States.
He described Australia as a large continent a long way from the world’s major centres of conflict and questioned what he described as Australia’s “supine fear” concerning China.
Powell argued that Australia’s security architecture should not effectively be provided by another country.
He also questioned why Australian superannuation funds invest in American markets and defence industries and called for greater transparency and auditing of those investments.
He argued that China is too economically and strategically important to Asia to be excluded from discussions about the region’s future security architecture.
His central argument was that China must be part of the conversation about Asian security.
8. Claire Moore — parliamentary scrutiny and social licence
Former Queensland Senator Claire Moore made an important submission concerning parliamentary accountability and the need for a social licence for AUKUS.
Moore questioned the separation of defence policy from foreign affairs and trade and argued that decisions of such magnitude require much greater parliamentary scrutiny.
She said she could not find a clear public record explaining where and how the original Morrison Government decision to enter AUKUS had been made.
She argued that the decision should have been subjected to parliamentary scrutiny, including through Senate Estimates and the committee system.
Moore was particularly concerned about the proposed eastern-seaboard submarine facility at Port Kembla, where she said the local community feels targeted but has not been given a meaningful role in determining what happens.
She emphasised the importance of social licence, particularly where communities are being asked to accept nuclear infrastructure and the long-term storage and disposal of radioactive waste.
Rear Admiral Chris Barry agreed that nuclear waste is a paramount issue.
Moore’s evidence therefore connected several of the central themes of the inquiry: parliamentary accountability, community consultation, nuclear waste and the democratic legitimacy of AUKUS.
8. Margaret Pestorius: AUKUS and the military-industrial system.
Of all the submissions heard yesterday, Margaret Pestorius from Wage Peace directly challenged the underlying political and economic character of AUKUS. Her argument went beyond questions of Australia’s national interest, strategic independence or social democracy. She connected AUKUS to the broader war machine, the profits of the corporate arms industry and Australia’s involvement in a system of militarisation that is inseparable from the genocide being carried out in Gaza.
The other submissions raised important questions about national interest, sovereignty, democratic accountability and Australia’s strategic future. But Margaret Pestorius was prepared to challenge the deeper assumption underlying AUKUS itself: that Australia’s security is best served by integrating ever more closely with the military and weapons systems of the United States and Britain, and by directing enormous public resources towards the machinery of war.
Margaret Pistorius presented a significant departure from the conventional submarine debate.
She argued that AUKUS should not be understood simply as the purchase of submarines. In her view, large amounts of the annual expenditure will flow into other military projects and industries.
She described this broader system as predatory capitalism and connected Australian defence production with the international arms industry and the war in Gaza.
She argued that Israel should effectively be considered a fourth participant in the broader military-industrial system and referred to the work of UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese.
These were arguments made by Ms Pestorius and should be treated as such rather than presented as established findings of the inquiry. The chair, Peter Garrett, gave Margaret Pestorius a friendly but pointed warning that some of her statements could potentially have legal consequences. In particular, he drew attention to her references to prominent Australian ministers and former ministers as lobbyists for the weapons industry.
Garrett’s response to Pestorius claim that militaristic thinking is fundamentally a product of male socialisation was: how do we account for someone such as Jennifer Parker — a woman who has spent her career in the Navy and is now one of Australia’s prominent intellectual advocates for AUKUS?
Margaret pistorius’s main claim was that AUKUS is necessary because of national security is a sham and a fake.
The current government itself describes AUKUS in terms of protecting Australia’s sovereignty, trade and prosperity, so the question of what actually constitutes security is central to the dispute.
Admiral Chris Barrie took up this argument, pointing out that national security encompasses much more than military threats between nation states. Climate change, he argued, is itself a national security issue. Margaret Pestorius agrees with this.
Comment: However, I don’t think that tells the whole story because climate change is different to wars between nation states. Climate change is contributed to by the military, but climate change affects everyone. It’s a human problem, and it’s a global problem. It’s not something that can be limited to the nation state. There may be some nation states who are, like Australia, we’re on a continent that may escape being submerged, like the Pacific Islands, but Kiribati and such like. But the thing is, our cities can still be incinerated by climate change.
9. Barbara Hartley: IPAN and the nuclear-waste problem
Barbara Hartley of the Independent and Peaceful Australian Network (IPAN) said she was not opposed to defence but was opposed to AUKUS.
She expressed concern about:
long-term radioactive waste; the lack of public scrutiny; secrecy; inadequate regulation; climate resilience; peacebuilding; and the need for transparent decision-making.
She called for an immediate suspension of AUKUS and an inquiry into the lobbying surrounding the project, including the activities of former Defence Minister Christopher Pyne.
Hartley also drew upon her experience as a Japanese teacher and urged people to consider the lessons of Hiroshima. She referred to the Maruki Gallery and its paintings depicting the human consequences of the atomic bombing.
10. Annette Brownlie: secrecy since September 2021
Annette Brownlie of Just Peace returned to the question of transparency.
She argued that secrecy had surrounded AUKUS since the Morrison Government’s decision in September 2021.
She referred to petition campaigns against AUKUS and to Freedom of Information research, including work by Rex Patrick.
Brownlie raised questions about the proposed submarine facilities, particularly Port Kembla, and the absence of clear Federal Government announcements concerning their location and purpose.
She also raised questions about Pine Gap and the lack of information available about its precise role in AUKUS.
Rear Admiral Chris Barry stressed that some of the documents being cited were Defence Department documents rather than necessarily representing a final government decision.
Again, the veil of secrecy surrounding AUKUS was a recurring theme.
11. Alex Mandel: six questions about AUKUS
Alex Mandel, who described himself as a former arms dealer who subsequently became a peace advocate, described AUKUS as a multigenerational strategic commitment.
He asked:
When will the submarines actually arrive? What independent audit will be conducted? Where will the Defence facilities be located? How will nuclear material and waste be stored and transported? Are the promised 20,000 jobs genuinely additional jobs? Is Australia committing itself to a future war involving China?
He also questioned Australia’s dependence on foreign suppliers, legal sovereignty and whether there has been genuine democratic consent.
He argued that Australia should seek greater self-reliance and evidence-based answers.
12. Jenny Levington: social spending and the environment
Jenny Levington raised questions about the financial priorities involved in AUKUS and suggested that money committed to the program could instead help sustain important social programs, including the NDIS.
She also raised the environmental consequences of submarine sonar for whales and dolphins, whose dependence on sound makes them vulnerable to underwater acoustic activity.
This added environmental security to the broader definition of national security being developed during the hearing.
Jenny Levington raised concerns about secrecy and the increasing influence of military priorities throughout Australian society.
She questioned the continuing expansion of military technology and expressed concern about the influence of the defence establishment across Australia’s education system, from early childhood through universities.
She also returned to the unresolved question of radioactive waste.
The main issues emerging from the Brisbane hearing
Taken together, the submissions reveal that the AUKUS debate is far broader than the question of whether Australia should buy nuclear-powered submarines.
13. Alex Mandl – former defence materiel supplier
AUKUS is an inter-generational strategic nuclear defence agreement that will dominate our defence for the rest of the century. What is the opportubity cost? How many jobs? Are the 20,000 jobs offered genuine? AUKUS subs are likely to be nuclear armed.
14. Magrid Bryn-Burns (WILPF?)
This speaker challenged the economic waste, she said that there is no money back guarantee for AUKUS. She lamented how the miltiary gets into iur education syste,.
15. Cameron Leckie: Former member of the ADF – End of US empire
Racist fear of yellow peril. No China wars. Avoiding wars. US genocide in Gaza … Venezuela … Greenland … Iran etc.
AUKUS is a threat to economic competitiveness. STEM enrollments are low. The STEM workforce needed to deliver workers will cause shortages in other industries. We will struggle to support AUKUS. Highly unlikely that we will get the submarines. Submarines are a distraction. Rotation force based out of Australia (Stirling and Port Kembla). Amberley airforce may be a target.
End the US alliance but there would be a response. Stop the charade that we are going to get the Subs. Egregious war of aggression against Iran, we should have nothing to do with this.
16. Charli Bran on behalf of Peace is Union Business QLD
Peace is union business
Violence and militarism. Housing crisis. Funding is a choice. Burden of nuclear waste. Workers should be prioritised. Don’t think solely about borders … we need think about human effects.
The Brisbane hearing raised a series of fundamental questions:
1. Who made the decision to enter AUKUS?
2. What exactly did Australia sign up to?
3. Is AUKUS a submarine program or a much broader US-UK-Australian military and weapons system?
4. Who controls the advanced technologies being developed?
5, Are the submarines primarily defensive or offensive weapons?
6. Does AUKUS make Australia safer, or could it make Australia a target in a conflict involving China?
7. What happens to Australia’s sovereignty when its defence and intelligence systems become increasingly integrated with those of the United States and Britain?
8. Who has the constitutional power to take Australia to war?
9. Why has there been so little parliamentary scrutiny of a commitment potentially costing hundreds of billions of dollars?
10. Where is the social licence for the communities that will host submarine bases and nuclear infrastructure?
11. What is the long-term plan for radioactive waste?
12. What are the opportunity costs for housing, health, education, the NDIS and environmental protection?
13. What happens if the strategic assumptions underlying AUKUS change?
And perhaps the most fundamental question:
14. What does Australia actually mean by national security?
Summary: The witnesses at Brisbane were not simply arguing that Australia does not need defence.
They were asking whether Australia’s security should primarily be based upon nuclear-powered submarines, advanced weapons systems and deeper integration with the United States, or whether national security should encompass diplomacy, conventional defence, nuclear non-proliferation, regional cooperation, parliamentary control over war-making, climate resilience, social security, environmental protection and Australia’s capacity to make independent decisions.
The significance of the Brisbane hearing is therefore that it opened up questions that have rarely received the level of public attention given to the price tag and technical specifications of the submarines.
AUKUS is a commitment extending across generations. It involves hundreds of billions of dollars, nuclear technology, major defence infrastructure, international alliances and potentially profound consequences for Australia’s foreign policy.
The central issue raised repeatedly throughout the hearing was therefore one of democratic accountability:
Before Australia commits hundreds of billions of dollars and embeds itself for generations in a US-UK strategic military system, Australians should be entitled to know exactly what they are signing up to, why they are doing it, what the risks and alternatives are, who controls the technology, who pays the eventual bill, and who ultimately has the power to decide whether Australia goes to war.
That was the underlying challenge placed before the AUKUS Public Inquiry in Brisbane on 25 August 2026.
* These notes were taken by Ian Curr attending the inquiry at the QCU on 25 Sept 2026. Apologies for errors and ommissions. Please suggest changes in the comments section below. I may have missed one oral submission, sorry.