The propagandists whose writings are in evidence in this case and terrorists who respond to their call (like the offenders now before the Court cannot sensibly be regarded as mere anti-social deviants. It could not be clearer that jihadi propagandists and terrorists are motivated by religion and are able to identify scriptural support for their actions. They consistently invoke belligerent verses of the Quran. (R v Bayda; R v Namoa (No 8) para 72) – Justice Desmond Fagan 2016.
Australian judges are noted for their religious bias. For example, many have Catholic backgrounds, and most come from wealthy private schools subsidised by the state. Such relgious and political bias from the mouth of Justice Fagan in the ‘Islam Bonnie and Clyde‘ case in New South Wales. Justice Desmond Fagan is the son of the long serving Labor Attorney-General of Tasmania, Roy Fagan.
Judge Fagan made the following comments in the F*ck Israel graffiti trial:
“The slogan is a curse against a foreign state. It does not convey hatred of or prejudice against Jewish people as a whole or against any Jewish person or people by reason of being Jewish,” Fagan said in his decision.
“Many Jewish people worldwide, including in Australia, are outspokenly and vehemently opposed to and critical of the state of Israel.” – Justice Fagan.
Meanwhile, in the UK, we read this legal warning to the National Health, on its adoption of the racist IHRA definition of antisemitism endorsed by Australian state and federal governments. Caution: People looking for rationality and justice in laws created by dangerous colonial and settler states and interpreted by privileged judges are destined for a sorry surprise. Editor, WBT 11 Aug 2026.
The legal implications of the adoption of the IHRA Definition of antisemitism within the
NHS
The Government, the Secretary of State for Health, and NHS England (“NHSE”) have each encouraged NHS organisations to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism (the “IHRA working definition” or “IHRA definition”).
Health Workers 4 Palestine (“HW4P”) are concerned about this. They believe that the adoption by NHS organisations of the IHRA working definition will lead to unlawful censorship of speech by healthcare workers, which is supportive of the Palestinian people and critical of Israel. They wish to understand the extent to which the law protects their members, and other workers and patients within the NHS, from censorship of that kind.
This advice addresses that question. We explain the legal obligations of NHS organisations in respect of the adoption and application of the IHRA working definition in regulating the speech of health workers and patients. We set out the legal issues that NHS organisations are likely to face if they choose to adopt and then apply the IHRA definition, including the risks of (i) interfering with free speech rights or (ii) discriminating on grounds of race, religion or belief.
We understand that HW4P intends to provide this advice to NHS organisations who are either (i) considering whether to adopt the IHRA definition, or (ii) have already adopted the definition, in the first case to assist them in deciding whether to adopt the definition at all and in the latter case to assist them in complying with their legal obligations when considering how to apply it.
We have drafted this advice with that purpose in mind.
5. For the reasons set out below, there is a very real risk that, absent careful thought, NHS organisations who choose to adopt and apply the IHRA definition will do so in a manner that is unlawful.
In summary: 5.1. 5.2. It will not be lawful for an NHS organisation to use the IHRA definition to shield Israel from criticism. Speech, which criticises the conduct or ideology of a nation state, is essential to the functioning of any democracy and attracts the highest degree of legal protection.
Save in very clear and extreme circumstances, it will not be antisemitic for a person to criticise the conduct of Israel or to challenge the moral legitimacy of its creation or continued existence as a state. An attempt by an NHS organisation to apply the IHRA definition to censure such speech is likely, therefore, to constitute an unlawful restriction of freedom of expression.
It will only be antisemitic for a person to criticise Israel, or to challenge its right to exist, if they are motivated in doing so by hatred or prejudice toward Jews as Jews (as opposed to any one of the myriad other reasons why a person might criticise Israel, or challenge its legitimacy). It will not be lawful for an NHS organisation to apply the IHRA definition in a way that relies on racist stereotypes against Palestinian people, such as the beliefs that
(i) they do not exist as a people;
(ii) their national aspirations are motivated by antisemitic hatred, as opposed to the natural inclination of any people to be free from alien occupation and domination, or
(iii) they are inherently violent or predisposed to violence. In the same way, it is not lawful for an NHS organisation to apply the IHRA definition in a way that relies on racist or Islamophobic stereotypes against Muslims.
If an NHS organisation applies the IHRA definition in a way which relies upon such stereotypes (whether expressly or otherwise), it is likely to act in a manner that violates fundamental rights to freedom of expressionand/or belief and/or in a manner which infringes the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”).
5.3. 6. It will not be lawful for an NHS organisation to apply the IHRA definition in a way which relies on racist stereotypes against Jewish people, such as the beliefs that
(i) Jewish people automatically associate with and/or have an affinity for Israel; or
(ii) Jewish people are necessarily offended or upset by symbols of Palestinian national identity or existence. If an NHS organisation applies the IHRA definition in a way which relies upon such stereotypes (whether expressly or otherwise), it is likely to act in a manner that violates Article 10 and/or 9 ECHR and/or in a manner which infringes the EA 2010.
If NHS Trusts apply the IHRA definition in a manner which is unlawful, they will face legal and reputational risks. Those risks arise, most obviously, in the form of claims brought by staff or patients who face unlawful discrimination or restrictions on their Article 9 or 10 rights.
7. 8. NHS organisations may therefore wish to think carefully as to whether it is appropriate (or helpful) for them to adopt the IHRA working definition. They are under no legal obligation to do so. Whilst the Secretary of State has the power to give NHSE directions as to the exercise of its functions, and NHSE in turn has the power to give directions to NHS Trusts as to their exercise of their functions, neither of those powers has been exercised in relation to the IHRA working definition.
If, despite the risks we identify, NHS organisations are inclined to adopt the IHRA working definition, then we consider that it will be necessary for them to provide written guidance as to its application. Given the opacity of the working definition, and its potential to be understood and applied in a manner that infringes ECHR rights, guidance will be imperative in
(i) enabling individuals subject to the relevant NHS organisation’s jurisdiction properly to regulate their conduct and speech, and
(ii) limiting arbitrariness in enforcement.
A failure to provide guidance will likely give rise to interferences with freedom of expression and belief which may not be “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Articles 9 and/or 10 ECHR and would accordingly be unlawful under s.6 of the HRA 1998.
9. We would therefore encourage any NHS organisation which chooses to adopt the IHRA working definition simultaneously to promulgate guidance as to its application. Such guidance should address, for example:
(i) the circumstances in which the IHRA working definition will be applied,
(ii) the purposes for which it will be so applied,
(iii) the potential consequences of any finding that impugned speech has fallen foul of the definition,
(iv) the status and relevance of the accompanying “examples” in the context of an assessment of whether impugned speech is properly to be characterised as antisemitic; and
(v) the way(s) in which the organisation will apply those examples in a manner consistent with its obligations under the HRA 1998 and EA 2010.
10. We set out our detailed reasons for arriving at those views below. Our advice is structured as follows: 10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4. 10.5.
In Section B, we summarise the basic policy considerations which inform NHSE’s encouragement to NHS organisations to adopt the IHRA working definition.
In Section C we address the legal framework governing NHS organisations in their application of the IHRA working definition to the speech of NHS employees and patients.
In Section D, we summarise extra-judicial and judicial consideration of the limits of the IHRA working definition.
In Section E we set out our analysis as to the legal risks which NHS organisations face in adopting and/or applying the IHRA working definition.
In Section F, we provide some worked examples of speech which would, and would not, amount to antisemitism on a lawful interpretation of that policy.
Read more @ https://www.healthworkers4palestine.com/docs/Legal-implications-of-IHRA-in-NHS.pdf
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