“He who lies here, it said, marched
Not to conquer a foreign land, but
His own.“
– Bertolt Brecht, “The Tombstone of the Unknown Soldier of the Revolution“
If there is one thing that socialists may learn from the SEQEB dispute in 1985 … that is we must prepare for strike action far better, with more thought, greater organisation, and keener political judgement. The limitations of this story are the limitations of the workers movement itself.
This is however an attempt at a broader view than was possible during the strike itself. It is not a chronicle of the failings of the Trades and Labour Council or the Electrical Trade Union leadership, the author is not qualified to deal in specific criticism of the trade union leadership. In contrast, a general critique of social democracy is more useful now in preparation for political struggles ahead. A detailed critique of our own socialist organisation is necessary.
We need to dispel the naivete with which we dealt with both to be Bjelke-Peterson government and the Trades and Labour Council leadership. To do this I intend to take stock of our resources, tactics, and strategies during a campaign that lasted nearly 12 months. It is the defeat of the SEQEB workers that was the single shining star that led Bjelke-Peterson back into government in 1986. Peterson had failed on all other accounts. The Queensland government failed to bring cheap electricity to consumers. It failed to save the economy. The government brought greater hardship and unemployment to Queenslanders than they had experienced since the Great Depression. For example, during the 38-hour dispute by Queensland government employees in 1982, the working class town of Ipswich could organise a demonstration of over 5,000 people. By 1986, at the height of the SEQEB dispute on 20 August 1985, whilst Brisbane could mobilise nearly 15,000 workers, Ipswich could barely manage 800.
The simple lesson is that the Queensland government had nearly trebled the unemployment rate in Ipswich in those years so that in 1986 it stood at twice the national average. A Labor administration in local town council could do nothing to stem the demise of this provincial industrial city. It resorted to IT and education where once stood railway workshops, metal works, boilermakers, transport industry, mines and power-stations. So too in other parts of the state. The demise of industry and commerce was real. Bjelke-Peterson’s power had been on the wane, nevertheless he had managed to defeat organised labour on our home turf.” – from Diary of SEQEB Dispute, Ian Curr, 1986.
During the 1985 SEQEB dispute I was a probationary clerk at my desk in the Department of Social Security trying to pay the wives of workers laid off in mines, transport, Ipswich. Unemployment benefit forms stood stacked on the desk before me. I processed them as fast as I could. The lines of distressed wives was stretched around the block below. Pressure was coming from Bill Hayden’s office down the hallway. Could the centre hold? My bosses didn’t think I was processing fast enough. The Murdock press accused union members of rorting the dole without any evidence. The local bosses tried to sack me, even resorting to bringing into contention my special branch file from the street marches from 1977-79. Thanks to the solidarity of a CPSU union delegate from the Commonwealth Employment Service, I staved off their attempt to put me out of a job. They needed a scapegoat, preferably from out of town who didn’t participate in sexist blue movie nights and the happy hour.
In August 1985, I attended a protest of sacked SEQEB workers outside the Executive Building in George Street, Brisbane, and was attacked from behind, knocked to the ground and arrested by Snr Constable Walsh and Constable Monley. The latter did his best to snap my wrist. I was holding up a banner saying Joh Must Go
The Brisbane Labour History Association is commemorating the SEQEB dispute which resulted in destroying the lives of many workers and their families. What was the role of Labor and union leaders at the time, people like Neville Warburton (ALP leader), Dick Williams (ETU organiser and later ALP President), Ray Dempsey (TLC Secretary), Allan Doodney (ETU organiser), Bob Hendricks (ETU and later Secretary), John Camp, and Hugh Hamilton?
Or is the sellout still too raw after 40 years for some plain talking?
Union officials capitulated under pressure from Queensland Premier Bjelke-Peterson, Bill Kelty (ACTU Secretary) and Bob Hawke. Why were the powerhouse workers lied to? That the SEQEB workers would get their jobs back if they turned the lights back on? Why did Simon Crean tell the workers he could get a couple of hundred jobs back when Bjelke-Petersen was refusing to negotiate with the union? Why did ALP heavyweights, Assistant-Secretary of the Trades and Labour Council (TLC), Tom Barton, and the TLC’s media spokesperson, David Hinchcliffe assault Pat Spence, the mother of a sacked SEQEB worker, on May Day 1986? Why was the leader of the strike committe, Bernie Neville, offered a bribe to quit the dispute?
Amidst all this, we should not forget the tremendous solidarity given to sacked SEQEB workers by union members across the country. We should not forget that the Queensland Government was under extreme pressure particularly when the Transport Workers Union imposed a blockade at the border. Businesses were pleading with Bjelke-Peterson to relent and allow the workers back to work. It was a close run thing.
The Senate of the University of Queensland gave Bjelke-Peterson and honorary doctorate of laws during the dispute. March to the chagrin of the academics who had earned their doctorates.
But the tough questions remain. – Ian Curr, Ed., WBT, 18 July 2025.
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Remembering the 40th anniversary of SEQEB
1985 – 2025 – Forty years since SEQEB hosted by the Brisbane Labour History Association. Speakers include, Bob Carnegie.
